A closed incident is a decision that a threat was handled. We re-investigate every closure from the raw evidence, whether a person or a playbook made it, and tell you which calls were wrong and whether the threat is still live. Read-only, and nothing in your workspace changes.
A short call, at no cost, confirms fit. The standard run re-checks one week of High and Medium closures, typically 40 to 50 incidents, and returns a prioritised list your team can act on.
The detection fired. Somebody, or something, decided it was nothing and closed it. From that moment the incident record says the threat was handled, your metrics agree, and nobody looks at it again. The detection was right. The decision may not have been.
A playbook that closes an account-compromise incident as benign keeps the queue moving. It also makes a security decision that nothing reviews, and it makes the same decision on the same account again next week.
A real compromise closed as harmless does not go away. It sits behind a green tick while the attacker keeps their access. It is the one incident nobody is looking at, and that is the worst place for it to be.
Often the compromise is quietly handled off the back of the incident by a separate remediation process. The account is reset, the incident stays labelled benign, and the gap never shows up anywhere you would measure it.
This is not a story about a bad team. In the engagement below, the people were right 80% of the time and missed nothing. The automation was wrong 42% of the time. That is a specific, fixable finding, and it is invisible until somebody re-reads the closures, because the only record of the decision is the decision itself.
An independent, read-only re-investigation of your already-closed Sentinel incidents. We start from the raw events, not from the closing note, and we reach our own verdict on each one. Then we tell you where the recorded classification does not match what the evidence shows.
What the alert actually fired on, what the raw events show about reach, success and source, and whether the activity landed. The closing summary is the last thing we read, not the first.
Analyst closures and playbook closures are validated the same way, and every finding says who or what made the call, so the fix lands in the right place: a person's judgement or a closure rule.
Where a true positive was closed as benign we show it from the evidence, corroborated by any containment that was taken on the account or device. Where nothing was contained, the evidence still stands on its own, and we say so.
For every confirmed mis-closure we check whether the activity continued after the incident was shut. A wrongly closed incident can leave a live compromise running, and that is the finding you need first.
It is not an audit of your analysts. In every run so far the human path has been the reference standard, and the findings point at the automation and the process around it. It is not a change to anything: the whole review is read-only, we never modify a workspace, a rule or an incident, and every flag comes back to your team as a candidate to re-review, not a verdict imposed on you.
One engagement, anonymised. We re-checked every High and Medium incident one estate had closed in a single week, so nothing below was selected to look good.
Every High and Medium incident closed in seven days was re-investigated, split by who or what closed it. The analysts' closures held up: 80% were right, and not one real threat was missed. The automation's closures did not: 13 of 31 were genuine compromises marked benign.
Under UK GDPR a personal data breach has to be reported within 72 hours of becoming aware of it. An account compromise that was closed as harmless may be a reportable personal data breach that nobody is aware of, so the clock never starts, and the first time anyone finds out is when something else goes wrong. The same logic runs through the assurance regimes that ask you to show your incidents were handled: the evidence has to exist, and a closure with no rationale is not evidence.
The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is expected to widen reporting duties and bring managed service providers into scope directly. When it passes, the question "how do you know your closed incidents were really closed?" stops being a good practice question and becomes one you will be asked. None of these regimes names closure validation. They require the outcome and the evidence, and this is how you get both.
The standard run takes the High and Medium incidents closed in the last seven days, typically 40 to 50, with read-only access.
Each incident is reconstructed from the raw events, compared against a second automated risk check and any containment taken, and traced forward to see whether the threat persisted after closure.
Confirmed mis-closed, to re-open now. Needs review, flagged with no containment seen, worst first. Looks correct, with the assurance recorded. Every finding names who or what closed it.
Tell us what you run and who closes your incidents, and we will come back to arrange a short, no-cost call. If we do not think a run would tell you anything, we will say so.
We will come back to you within one working day to arrange a short call.
A short call is enough to scope it. Read-only, one week of closures, and a list your team can act on.
Request a validation run